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Africa is the “Global Economy’s Last Frontier”! Images of the African continent as a 
boon of mineral riches, and a new legal Far West pervade media and scholarly accounts. Yet, 
these images tend to reflect the protracted political and development dependency of African 
states, with lawyers involved in corporate dealings on the continent either denounced as 
mercenaries at the service of neo-colonial “looting” or idealized as missionaries of the rule of 
law. This article suggests a research strategy that moves away from these ideological and 
political accounts. It uses lawyers’ trajectories and professional strategies as an entry-point to 
re-globalize the longue durée of the unequal and uneven connections between Africa and the 
world. The “Africa” Bar in Paris— the empirical focus of this article—emerges as a microcosm 
of such interconnected and enduring histories of globalization. Offshore, yet connected, this 
Bar is a “cross-roads” space across politics and economics, shaped by the legacies of the ties 
between Paris, the metropole, and its former African colonies, and ongoing waves of corporate 
legal globalization from the U.S. toward Europe and most recently the African continent.  
INTRODUCTION 
Africa is the “Global Economy’s Last Frontier”! Certainly, recent global developments 
have lent credence to this claim by Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, the deputy governor of the 
Central Bank of Nigeria.1 In the last fifteen years, the African continent has emerged as an 
untapped boon for energy commodities: in 2013, fuel and mineral exports reached $397 million, 
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1  See generally KINGSLEY CHIEDU MOGHALU, EMERGING AFRICA:  HOW THE  GLOBAL  ECONOMY’S  ‘LAST  
FRONTIER’  CAN  PROSPER  AND  MATTER (2013) (demonstrating how Africa’s progress in the twenty-first century 
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fifteen times more than development aid into the continent. 2  Particularly since the 2007 
financial crisis, multinational corporate law firms have also shown an unprecedented interest in 
branching out into the continent, be it to set up “Africa” offices in rising African hubs—
Casablanca, Johannesburg, or Abidjan—or in global financial capitals and former métropoles: 
New York, London, or Paris. Yet, this “Africa rising” picture contrasts sharply with the Afro-
pessimism image of a continent seen to be doomed by the “resource curse,” poor governance, 
weak legal institutions, corruption, violent conflict, and political instability. To boot: it is also 
in these “new frontiers,” like the eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo, where 
global capitalism “finds minimally regulated zones in which to vest its operations,”3 that the 
Far-West, like rush for extractive boons, has been most pronounced from the 1990s.  
While the central role played by the African continent in the constitution of modern 
states and trade systems has long been established, this imagery of the “new frontier” is not just 
historically inaccurate. Narratives that continue to portray Africa as disconnected and non-
global continue to have important political effects—not least because they shape knowledge 
and scholarly hierarchies about legal, political, and social developments across the continent. 
This is especially true for legal and economic globalization dynamics in Africa.  
Indeed, law itself often still conjures the image of failed colonial legacies and transplants 
on the African continent. In particular, there is still an exceptional knowledge gap on legal 
professions in Africa, their structure and their evolution over time, compared to the important 
wealth of research on legal professions in Europe, North America, Latin America, and more 
recently South-East Asia.4 Reflecting the ebb and flow of policy pulls, research on law and 
                                                      
2 See generally TOM BURGIS, THE LOOTING MACHINE: WARLORDS, TYCOONS, SMUGGLERS AND THE SYSTEMATIC 
THEFT OF AFRICA’S WEALTH (2015) (describing the way resource trade wreaks havoc on Africa).  
3 JEAN COMAROFF & JOHN L. COMAROFF, THEORY FROM THE SOUTH: OR, HOW EURO-AMERICA IS EVOLVING 
TOWARD AFRICA 13 (2012). 
4 With few exceptions, e.g., ÉRIC GOBE, LES AVOCATS EN TUNISIE DE LA COLONISATION A LA REVOLUTION 
(1883-2011): SOCIOHISTOIRE D’UNE PROFESSION POLITIQUE (2013); Sara Dezalay, Les Juristes en Afrique: Entre 
Trajectoires d’État, Sillons d’Empire et Mondialisation 138 POLITIQUE AFRICAINE 5, 7 (2015) (Fr.). 
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legal institutions in African contexts is also overwhelmingly subjected to a protracted 
dependency lens. Therefore, when under focus, lawyers are either hailed as missionaries of the 
rule of law5 or they are the new mercenaries of neo-colonial corporate interests.6  
The researcher interested in the role of lawyers in extractive economies is also 
confronted with another set of challenges. Should the corporate lawyers involved in extractive 
deals be considered as an object of inquiry? Certainly not, a priori, if the focus is restricted to 
the highly technical intricacies of the law they produce: competition, merger & acquisition, and 
project-finance. This technical barrier of entry is not the only hurdle, not only because 
extractive contracts remain for the most part sealed under a veil of secrecy, but also due to the 
nature of extractive economies. The role of extractives in European colonialism across Africa  
and the expansion of modern global capitalism has long been studied. 7  Extractive 
infrastructures themselves are increasingly recognized as a driver shaping social and political 
change in the longue durée.8 The microcosm of Bonny, in the Niger Delta in Nigeria, is one of 
many striking examples: it has switched over time from slave trade, to palm oil, to crude oil by 
building on similarly entangled shadow and official economic routes and social networks.9 Yet 
the still predominant focus on the “resource curse” 10—seen to be affecting resource-rich 
African countries by impeding economic and societal development due to wealth capture by 
corrupt political elites—remains for the most part surprisingly ahistorical and state-centric. This 
                                                      
5 E.g., FATES OF POLITICAL LIBERALISM IN THE BRITISH POST-COLONY: THE POLITICS OF THE LEGAL COMPLEX 
(Terence C. Halliday, Lucien Karpik & Malcolm M. Feeley eds., 2012).  
6 E.g., BURGIS, supra note 2. 
7 See, e.g., FREDERICK COOPER, AFRICA IN THE WORLD: CAPITALISM, EMPIRE, NATION-STATE (2014); STEPHEN 
ELLIS, SEASON OF RAINS: AFRICA IN THE WORLD (2011). 
8 On the role of extractive infrastructures, see generally DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY 
NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY AND POVERTY (2014) (arguing that man-made political and 
economic institutions are the underlying reasons for economic success).  
9 See ELLIS, supra note 7, at 11-13. 
10 See generally PAUL COLLIER, THE BOTTOM BILLION: WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES ARE FALLING AND WHAT 
CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2007) (exploring the reasons why impoverished countries fail to progress despite 
international aid and support). 
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is problematic given the now intensely globalized and financialized character of extractive 
value chains: on what scale, indeed, or level, should the analysis be focused?    
To go beyond these contradictory images and challenges, this article suggests a research 
agenda that emphasizes the interconnectedness,11 across time and scale, between dynamics of 
legal, political, economic, and social change across the African continent, and global 
transformations in capitalism and governance. Embracing the recent global turn in historical 
studies to re-globalize the African continent,12 this article builds on an ethnographic approach 
that emphasizes these interconnections as flows and “counter-flows”13 between African settings, 
former métropoles, and global markets.  
The case study that provides the empirical bulk of this article stems out of an apparently 
counter-intuitive example: the “Africa” Bar in Paris, which has emerged as a key site in which 
extractive deals between multinational corporations and African states are negotiated. Yet, 
tracing the individual trajectories and professional strategies of the lawyers operating within 
this social microcosm underscores the enduring double position of Paris: as a former colonial 
métropole, and also as a beach-head in the expansion of U.S.- and U.K.-led globalization of 
corporate law toward Europe from the 1980s, and more recently into Africa. The analysis of 
the social relations at play in this microcosm provides an entry-point to trace how the 
relationship between extractive economies, state transformations, and the position of Africa in 
globalization are negotiated in the longue durée. It is also a crucial site to map out law’s 
entanglement with social networks, politics, and economics, across time and space.  
This article proceeds in three steps: section two underscores the relevance of using 
lawyers’ trajectories and professional strategies as an entry point to trace state transformations 
                                                      
11 See generally SANJAY SUBRAHMANYAM, EXPLORATIONS IN CONNECTED HISTORY: FROM THE TAGUS TO THE 
GANGES (2005) (opening up a new framework for understanding history: “connected histories”).  
12 See COOPER, supra note 7, at 90-101. 
13 See generally BONNY IBHAWOH, IMPERIAL JUSTICE: AFRICANS IN EMPIRE’S COURT (2013) (studying the role 
and motivations of the Imperial Appeal Courts in Britain’s African colonies).  
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and global dynamics on the African continent; section three details the case study of the social 
microcosm of the “Africa” Bar in Paris; and section four offers concluding remarks opening up 
toward a wider research agenda.  
I. LAWYERS AND EXTRACTIVE ECONOMIES: AN ENTRY POINT TO TRACE THE UNEVEN AND 
UNEQUAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AFRICA AND THE WORLD 
 
The first dimension of the research strategy suggested here follows the path opened by 
a political sociology that underscores the roles of lawyers as power brokers in the formation of 
the state and in globalization. This approach underscores the position of lawyers as 
“intermediary elites” or “double agents” through their capacity to juggle contradictory social, 
political, and economic interests. Meanwhile, this entry point contributes to explaining 
transformations of state power and patterns of globalization. 14  This approach has proven 
particularly fruitful to study contemporary African contexts.15  
Thus, far from anecdotal evidence, details of lawyers’ trajectories help uncover their 
continuous strategies of double games. Ernst Kantorowicz16 and others in his wake have shown 
that while at the service of power holders—and thus playing a central role of legitimation of 
state power—lawyers  also needed to distance themselves from politics, as a condition to protect 
the autonomy of the law, and with it their professional practices. Indeed, these strategies are 
inscribed in the very structure of the law. From Renaissance Italy,17 thus, the law has been 
shown to be “a way to get access to and draw strength from a sovereign administration (such 
as the city states); to gain an academic and physical distance from state power; and to serve as 
                                                      
14 See generally YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT.G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, 
ECONOMISTS AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES (2002) (showing that the exports of 
expertise and ideals from the United States to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico have played a crucial role in 
transforming their state forms and economies since World War II). 
15 See Dezalay, supra note 4. 
16 See generally ERNST H. KANTOROWICZ, THE KING’S TWO BODIES: A STUDY IN MEDIEVAL POLITICAL 
THEOLOGY (2016). 
17 See LAURO MARTINES, LAWYERS AND STATECRAFT IN RENAISSANCE FLORENCE 5 (1968). See generally 
JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, THE MEDIEVAL ORIGINS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2008) (examining the power struggle 
between local courts and the Christian church, secular rule, and religious edict).   
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a go-between for different sovereign administrations and interests.”18 Between the state lawyer 
(e.g., the jurisconsulte of a national diplomacy) and the “merchant of law” at the service of 
corporations, there is a community of situation. The latter is defined by the promotion, arguably 
multifaceted but in the end converging, of legal competency as a necessary condition to 
negotiate conflicting social interests.19 Thus, the “fluidity of the title” of lawyers20 enables a 
capacity, varied according to periods and contexts, to play a multiplicity of social and 
professional roles between different sectors at the national level—politics, economics, and 
administration21—as much as across the local, the national, and the global.  
Conversely, there is now a wealth of research emphasizing the role played by raw 
commodities in the consolidation of European empires in the long nineteenth century and the 
expansion of contemporary capitalism.22 This interest for the longue durée not only recalls that 
the post-colonial nation-state is a modern political outcome of imperial legacies. It can also help 
understand the role played by extractive resources in the uneven and unequal connections 
between Africa and the world over time.23 However, while recent research is underlining the 
role played by private actors—such as lawyers—and contracts in transnational governance,24 
and that of law in global value chains,25 there is little research focusing specifically on the roles 
of lawyers in extractive economies. 
                                                      
18 Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, State Politics and Legal Markets, 10 COMP. SOC. 38, 53 (2011). 
19 See Antoine Vauchez, The Transnational Politics of Judicialization: Van Gend en Loos and the Making of EU 
Polity, 16 EUR. L.J. 1, 3–7 (2010). 
20 Laurent Willemez, La “République des avocats.” 1848: le Mythe, le Modèle et son Endossement, in MICHEL 
OFFERLÉ, PROFESSION POLITIQUE XIXÈ-XXÈ SIÈCLE 201 (1999). 
21 See Antoine Vauchez, L’avocat D’affaires: Un Professionnel de la Classe Dirigeante? , 19 SAVOIR/AGIR 39, 
41 (2012) (Fr.). 
22 See generally JANE BURBANK & FREDERICK COOPER, EMPIRES IN WORLD HISTORY: POWER AND THE POLITICS 
OF DIFFERENCE (2010) (examining the rise, competition, strategies, politics, and human aspects of Eurasian 
empires). 
23 See COOPER, supra note 7. 
24 See generally THE POLITICS OF PRIVATE TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE BY CONTRACT (A. Claire Cutler & 
Thomas Dietz eds., 2017) (exploring the public and private facets of contracts in the context of regulating local 
and global political economies through the use of private transnational contracts).  
25 See generally The IGLP Law and Global Production Working Group, 4 The Role of Law in Global Value 
Chains: A Research Manifesto, LONDON REV. INT’L L. 57 (2016) (asserting that legal regimes are a central part 
of the creation, structure, effects, and governance of global value chains). 
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The renewal of the debate on empires and their legacies opens up a second and fruitful 
avenue for the research strategy suggested in this article. Underscoring law as a central feature 
of European colonial empires,26 this scholarship has paved the way for research exploring these 
multifaceted contributions of lawyers as intermediaries of the state and of globalization over 
time. 27   Negotiating sovereignty as “shared out, layered [and] overlapping” 28  in imperial 
settings, lawyers could thus be seen to navigate between corporate and state power, the colony 
and the métropole, inter-imperial confrontations, and across colonial and post-colonial time and 
scale. Imperial and post-imperial legal realms were indeed particularly favorable to the 
positions of lawyers as both collaborators and opponents.29 These imperial legacies have also 
enabled the continuous circulation of lawyers, and their roles as go-betweens across sector, time, 
and scale in the postcolonial trajectories of the state: between politics, society and the market, 
local, national, and global fields. These multilayered double games are illustrated in the case 
study of the “Africa” Bar in Paris.  
This article suggests precisely that the subjectivities of lawyers—their individual 
trajectories, resources, and strategies—provide an entry-point to trace the interweaving between 
the local, the national, and the global, as well as the interplay between knowledge, law, 
economics, and politics in the fabric of extractive value chains. Focusing on the “Africa” Bar 
in Paris also provides a way to zoom in and out30 from the microcosm of the social relations 
that make up this Bar toward wider legal, political, social, and economic transformations.  
Indeed, the “Africa” Bar in Paris, just like other corporate legal marketplaces, is a 
“crossroads” space in which positions are distributed according to corporate power, politics, 
                                                      
26 See 1 LEGAL PLURALISM AND EMPIRES, 1500-1850 (Richard J. Ross & Lauren Benton eds., 2013). 
27 See Dezalay, supra note 4 (building on PIERRE BOURDIEU, SUR L’ÉTAT. COURS AU COLLEGE DE FRANCE 
(1989-1992) (2012)). 
28 BURBANK & COOPER, supra note 22, at 17. 
29 See Chidi Oguamanam & W. Wesley Pue, Lawyers’ Professionalism, Colonialism, State Formation and 
National Life in Nigeria, 1900-1960: “The Fighting Brigade of the People,” 13 SOC. IDENTITIES 769, 774 
(2006). 
30 See COOPER, supra note 7. 
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and social capital.31 Recent waves of corporate legal globalization, particularly from the 1980s 
in France and Continental Europe, help explain the prominence of U.K. and U.S. corporate law 
firms in this small, professional market. But this “Africa” Bar is not just a corporate Bar. It is a 
space that is offshore, as it is located in Paris; yet it is deeply connected to power structures in 
African settings.  
Indeed, this Bar is dominated by predominantly French, white, and male lawyers. It is 
embedded in the corporate, political, and social networks that tie Paris to its former colonies, 
and it has been deeply shaped by the boon of extractives, over time, from the colonial era to the 
present. This double geographical trope of Paris—as a beach-head of a U.S./U.K.-led legal 
corporate globalization, and former métropole—has defined the structure of this Bar: that is, 
the resources that are valued to gain access and be granted status within it.  
To build the empirical basis of this article, I have traced the careers and professional 
strategies of lawyers operating within this “Africa” Bar in Paris. I have relied on a qualitative 
methodology that can be described as relational biography.32 Asking respondents who they are, 
that is, exploring not only their professional and educational background but also their social 
characteristics, is a way to trace how successful their strategies could be in entering and 
positioning themselves within this small, professional market. Beyond, it is a way to map out 
the configuration of this space across time and space. In the following case study, I build on 
exemplary trajectories of lawyers operating within this small, professional market to trace the 
                                                      
31 See Antoine Vauchez, Élite Politico-Administrative et Barreau D'affaires. Sociologie d'un Espace- Frontier, 
140 POUVOIRS 71, 79 (2012) (Fr.). 
32 I have conducted about thirty interviews with lawyers from corporate law firms as well as other members of the 
Bar in Paris. Except for William Bourdon and Pascal Agboyibor, whose portraits are drawn below, and whose 
trajectories have been extensively documented in the media, I have used pseudonyms for all my other respondents. 
I have built this fieldwork incrementally, based on my previous research (in the context of my PhD and 
postdoctoral work) on the transformation since the Cold War of militant fields of human rights; the 
institutionalization of international criminal law; as well as the social and professional structure of international 
dispute settlement mechanisms. Concerning the “corporate” lawyers operating in Africa, from Paris, I used what 
could be described as a “swarming” technique: based on professional rankings of multinational corporate law firms, 
participant observation at professional conferences, and interviews so as to identify informants, and key players 
within this small market. 
  9 
structuration of this Bar over time, and its ongoing transformation under the impetus of global 
regulatory pushes and financialization.  
II.  THE “AFRICA” BAR IN PARIS: OFFSHORE, YET CONNECTED 
Due to the sulphurous legacy of the Françafrique, the reputation of lawyers involved in 
extractive dealings in former parts of the French Empire in Africa has been tainted with 
phantasms and denunciations. Large corruption cases have unveiled some of the shadow 
dealings of the Françafrique—like the “Elf case”—which erupted in 1994 and revealed major 
misappropriation of funds, while the French government, under the Mitterrand presidency, was 
involved in theaters of war in its enlarged “pré carré” in Central Africa.33 Lawyers, as the 
discrete but all-the-more-powerful advisors of African heads of state, also often occupy the 
front page of these political-economic scandals: the French-Lebanese lawyer Robert Bourgi, 
who accused former president Chirac among others—both to the right and the left sides of the 
French political spectrum—of having received cash (“valises à billets”) from African heads of 
states; 34  the late Jacques Vergès, as the shadow advisor of Moussa Traoré in Mali and 
Abdoulaye Wade in Senegal; or François Bozizé in the Central African Republic.  
Yet, the originally extremely select “Africa club” of Paris—comprising a handful of 
lawyers operating within a couple of French corporate law firms and a few U.K. and U.S. 
corporate law firms—has recently grown into an enlarged, though still restricted, market of 
about twenty lawyers, controlled by a dozen Paris offices of U.S. and U.K. corporate law firms. 
But this small market remains dominated predominantly by French, male lawyers. The 
trajectory of a prominent member of this Bar provides a first explanation of this transformation, 
which followed what could be described as a revamping of legal deals in the continent—but 
only, though, through a slight symbolic displacement.  
                                                      
33 See generally PIERRE PEAN, LA REPUBLIQUE DES MALLETTES: ENQUETE SUR LA PRINCIPAUTE FRANÇAISE DU 
NON-DROIT (2011) (examining the logic behind politico-financial scandals, including, but not limited to, Elf).  
34 See Vincent Hugeux & Boris Thiolay, Les Riches Secrets de la Françafrique, L’EXPRESS (Oct. 14, 2011), 
https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/les-riches-secrets-de-la-francafrique_1040383.html (Fr.). 
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A. From “White Marabout”35 of the Françafrique to Advocate of the Social Responsibility of 
Corporations 
 
“My specialty now is crisis management. Today, there is not one single country where 
there is not a risk of coup. But the risk is not only jurisdictional, it is also reputational.”36 This 
corporate lawyer, based since 1998 at the Paris office of the U.K. corporate law firm Herbert 
Smith Freehills and now a partner, is the head of the firm’s Africa practice, predominantly in 
the energy and mining sectors. He is also the mentor of the bulk of the new generation of 
corporate lawyers operating in Africa, from Paris offices and increasinglygrowingly from 
offices based on the continent. After studying law in France, Antoine37 left for Vanuatu, as a 
“conscientious objector,”38 where he became public prosecutor at the country’s independence 
in 1980. He then studied international law in Australia, “a rare vocation” at the time. After 
working at the Crédit du Nord for two years in financing, he moved to Gabon, as an associate 
at Fidafrica, the legal branch of PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), where he worked until 1998. 
In this capacity, he became the counsel of Samuel Dossou Aworet—Gabon’s “Mr. Oil.”  
In Gabon I did everything: social security law, labour law. You needed to be 
able to deal with emergencies, relentlessly . . . . Twenty-five years ago, when I 
started, people were telling me: “he is doing tam-tam fusions.” . . . I became a 
project lawyer once back in France. But I had carved out this competency with 
the knife and the d*** (“la bite et le couteau”). The new generation, they have 
not really ever been in Africa. They will never be “real” Africans. This does not 
mean they don’t do good work. But I would like to see them in crises 
situations . . . . Crisis management: it starts with me. In 95% of cases, the dispute 
is solved through settlement, especially in Africa . . . . These young lawyers, I 
would like to see them in a crisis situation. At some point, you need to stand 
straight, respectfully, and return to the law.39  
 
                                                      
35 Vincent Hugeux, La Françafrique Fait de la Résistance. Communicants, Journalistes et Juristes Français à 
L’heure de la Deuxième Décolonisation, 105 POLITIQUE AFRICAINE 126, 128 (2007) (Fr.). 
36 See Interview with Antoine, Partner, Herbert Smith Freehills, in Paris, Fr. (July 4, 2015). My translation is from 
French. Subsequent quotes in this portrait are derived from this interview. 
37 Antoine is a pseudonym. Unless otherwise specified I have used pseudonyms for all interviews to preserve the 
privacy and anonymity of my respondents.  
38 This was the technical alternative to the military service. 
39 Interview with Antoine, supra note 36. 
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The conversion of this “White African” into an advocate of the “social responsibility of 
corporations,” notably as a member of the Corporate Social Responsibility Committee of the 
American Bar Association, can be explained by external shocks—politically and economically 
driven. Those have tended to reinforce, generally, the prominence of lawyers in extractive deals 
from the 1990s: to negotiate extractive contracts; reform national mining codes and taxation 
regulations; and advise foreign corporations against political, social, and economic risks and 
increasingly local populations in their contests over the impact of extractive projects. But they 
have also contributed to revamping, albeit symbolically, the social structure of this small niche 
of counsels to extractive corporations and African heads of state. Indeed, the slight enlargement 
of this microcosm reflects in part the increased financialization of markets for extractives and, 
with it, the growing technicality of extractive deals.40 In this, multinational corporate law firms, 
with their collective know-how, from the negotiation of contracts to arbitration, can be better 
positioned. The Enron scandal in 2002, which shed light on the conflicts of interest of 
accountancy firms like PwC, until then the most widely pre-positioned in the African continent, 
also opened new opportunities for corporate law firms toward emerging economic markets in 
Africa.41   
Further, incentives for the global regulation of dealings between foreign corporations 
and resource-rich states in Africa, though for the most part a set of soft law that is non-binding 
on corporations, have had an increased impact on the operations of corporations on the 
continent, due to their reputational costs.42 Extractive deals in the African continent are also 
                                                      
40 See generally U. N. Conference on Trade and Development, Don’t Blame the Physical Markets: 
Financialization Is the Root Cause of Oil and Commodity Price Volatility, UNCTAD Policy Brief no. 25 (Sept. 
2012) (“Financialization is the root cause of oil and commodity price volatility.”).  
41 See Attack of the Bean Counters, ECONOMIST (Mar. 19, 2015), 
https://www.economist.com/news/business/21646741-lawyers-beware-accountants-are-coming-after-your-
business-attack-bean-counters. 
42 In particular, the growing reach of the 1977 US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) against corruption, and 
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative have had a notable impact. See generally EDDIE RICH & JONAS 
MOBERG, BEYOND GOVERNMENTS: MAKING COLLECTIVE GOVERNANCE WORK. LESSONS FROM THE 
EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (2015) (setting out a framework for those wishing to 
implement collective governance, involving civil society, companies, and governments as key actors).  
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heavily impacted by development policies and actors such as the World Bank, and bilateral 
development agencies. Those play a discrete yet central role in the negotiation of contracts 
between extractive corporations and resource-rich states. This institutes a trilateral relation 
between development donors, corporations, and states that is specific to the African context. 
Many lawyers in this “Africa club” thus got their introduction to the developing continent by 
working on sovereign debt restructuring in the 1980s. The waves of privatization of extractive 
industries—spearheaded by the World Bank through the 1980s—opened up opportunities for 
corporate lawyers, and so did the promotion of “public-private partnerships” from the early 
1990s, as they place the contract and the lawyer at the heart of the relation between the public 
sector and the private sector.43  
Driven foremost by the need to stabilize investments for foreign corporations—against 
challenges to extractive contracts, like national fiscal policies of “upwards adjustments” (so-
called “resource nationalism”), and jurisdictional contests—recent international policy 
endeavors have sought to “level the playing field” between foreign corporations and African 
states. For example, the CONNEX Initiative,44 spearheaded by the German government during 
its presidency of the G7 in 2014, aims at drafting a “code of conduct” to “strengthen advisory 
support to low-income country governments in their negotiation of complex commercial 
contracts.”45  
The African Legal Support Facility set up, in 2010, in Abidjan under the umbrella of 
the African Development Bank—and the sponsorship of the NGO Transparency 
International—similar endeavors to provide assistance to African states to strengthen their legal 
expertise and negotiating capacity in debt management and extractive contracts. For both 
initiatives, the explicit aim is to restructure legal services to African states away from a 
                                                      
43 VAUCHEZ, supra note 21, at 79. 
44 When translated from French, the words in the spelled-out version of CONNEX translate to “Strengthening 
Assistance for Complex Contract Negotiations.” 
45 THE GROUP OF SEVEN, CODE OF THE G7 CONNEX INITIATIVE 1 (2014).  
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charismatic market of shadow advisors, toward an enlarged and more transparent market of 
services to states.  
Yet, it is impossible to understand the position of this “White African” without taking 
in two other connected dynamics: the structuration of the corporate Bar in Paris, and the threads 
of relations between France and its former colonies. Both define the access and the distribution 
of positions in a space whose structure has been transformed under the impetus of the “Wall 
Street” law firm model, but whose boundaries remain defined by the capacities to access and 
juggle with poles of economic, political, and social power that have been shaped by the relations 
between Paris and its former African colonies.  
This is illustrated by the two series of portraits below of prominent members of the 
“Africa” Bar in Paris. These biographies highlight the types of legal, political, and social 
resources that play into the configuration of this microcosm. The first series of portraits, 
respectively of William Bourdon and Pascal Agboyibor, underlines special and temporal 
connections that remain otherwise invisible in the contemporary period if the focus is restricted 
to a national scale, or sectors, be it the technical know-how of corporate lawyers, or the legal-
political portfolio of human rights advocates. There is indeed a community of situation between 
Bourdon, the human rights lawyer, and Agboyibor, the most prominent “African” corporate 
lawyer within the “Africa” Bar in Paris: both navigate between political and corporate interests 
with a combination of resources—know-how and know-who—built out of both imperial 
legacies and corporate legal globalization.  
B. William Bourdon and Pascal Agboyibor: Building Legal Know-How out of Imperial 
Legacies and Corporate Legal Globalization 
1. William Bourdon, Sherpa 
The head of the NGO Sherpa created in Paris in 2001 to “protect and defend victims of 
economic crimes,” 46  William Bourdon is a prominent advocate of the criminalization of 
                                                      
46 Sherpa, https://www.asso-sherpa.org/accueil (last visited Feb. 26, 2018). 
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corporate crimes: this lawyer became known for the amicable settlement he struck in 2005 on 
behalf of eight Burmese who had lodged a complaint against the French firm Total for forced 
labor; more recently, he endorsed the cause of whistle-blowers as the lawyer of Antoine Deltour, 
the alleged source of part of LuxLeaks; Edward Snowden; Hervé Falciani (ex-HSBC); and 
Stéphanie Gibaud (ex-UBS). While vice-secretary general (1994–1995) and secretary general 
(1995–2000) of the French human rights NGO International Federation for Human Rights 
(FIDH), he was one of the vocal proponents of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal 
Court throughout the 1990s; the initiator, on behalf of the FIDH, of the complaint for crimes 
against humanity lodged against Hissène Habré in Senegal in 2000, which triggered a wave of 
universal jurisdiction complaints against African former heads of state.47 He was also one of 
the drivers of several complaints against sitting and former African heads of state for their “ill-
gotten wealth” (“biens mal acquis”) in France, on behalf of Sherpa and Transparency 
International; and the defender of two French detainees at Guantanamo. 
William Bourdon is also the counsel of private corporations, but his notoriety, as he 
explained, has driven some US and UK corporations away: “I think they are wrong, they are 
wrong in thinking that being a cause lawyer prevents me from having a cynical and 
manipulative side. I can be as cynical as they are.”48 What he described in his legal practice as 
“a constant juxtaposition, this medley between politicians, the powerful and the wretched of 
the Earth” is not simply a question of accommodating economic constraints by “playing on 
different fronts.” It is a capacity of circulation that can be explained by Bourdon’s background 
and trajectory, and his positioning at the intersection of multiple poles of political, economic, 
and militant power in France. In this, his family capital played an instrumental role: he is the 
grandson of the engineer in chief at Michelin, and the great-grandson of one of the founders of 
                                                      
47 See Julien Seroussi, La cause de la compétence universelle: Note de recherche sur l'implosion d'une 
mobilisation internationale, 173 ACTES DE LA RECHERCHE EN SCIENCES SOCIALES 98-109 (2008).  
48 Interview with William Bourdon, Attorney,  Sherpa, in Add Location of Interview here (Dec. 12, 2012). 
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Michelin, the rubber tire corporation grown into a transnational and powerful corporation out 
of rubber plants in Vietnam and other parts of the French colonial eEmpire. Originally targeting 
a diplomatic career (Sciences-Po, the French administrative school, l’École nationale 
d’administration and the Quai d’Orsay), he ended up studying law and registering to the Paris 
Bar in 1980. He started his career by interning with two tenors of the Paris Bar: Philippe 
Lemaire, a criminal lawyer and one of the proponents of the abolition of the death penalty in 
the 1970s, and Marc Barbé. The latter had founded one of the first French corporate law firms 
in Paris in the early 1970s, BCTG et Associés, with a portfolio of powerful corporate clients 
built up by Barbé while at Stephenson Harwood in London (Nike, Cadbury, etc.). Bourdon then 
set up his own law firms from the mid-1980s. He described his stint at the FIDH as a 
“parenthesis”:  
All this very strong engagement in international criminal law, it spurred jealousy, envy, 
petty manoeuvres . . . . I believe there is a pernicious cancer that constantly threatens 
NGOs . . . . It’s bureaucratization . . . . we strive to pave a way between the naivety of 
part of civil society which gets privatized through public subsidies, co-opted into public 
administrations—a dangerous partnership—and their near-systematic ideologization 
which denounces any corporate endeavour. . . . If economic actors tell you that they are 
losing market shares in Africa, you need to hear the argument. This is what enables me 
to circulate between spheres of power and conflicting interests.49 
 
2. Pascal Agboyibor, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP 
Arms folded on a grey suit and blue shirt, the obligatory uniform of the corporate lawyer, 
Pascal Agboyibor hints by an imperceptible smile the triumph that brought him to the cover of 
the monthly issue of Forbes Afrique in February 2015.50 This forty-seven-year-old Togolese 
lawyer is one of the very few—there are but a handful—Africans working at major 
multinational corporate law firms in Paris, what more, as a sitting member of the administrative 
council of the U.S. firm Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, and the head of its “Africa” 
department in Paris. He is hailed as a “shadow power broker” of transactions between states 
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50 Melina E. Ngisi, Pascal Agboyibor, L’avocat Qui Murmure à l’Oreille des Grands , FORBES AFRIQUE, Feb. 
2015, at 32 (Fr.). 
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and foreign corporations in the African continent.51 With a sixty person department, Orrick, he 
claims, invests a huge proportion of its activities—20 percent% in Africa.  
“I was taught very early on that I would become a lawyer.”52 The law, for Agboyibor, 
is an acute political and family matter. His father, Yawovi Agboyibo, former president of the 
Lomé Bar; political opponent; and prime minister in the transition between the Gnassingbé 
regimes (in 2006–2007), has been a prominent figure of the transition of Togo to a multi-party 
system in 1991. Yawovi Agboyibo had also turned to corporate law in the early 1970s by 
integrating the very first law firm of the country,53 after studying law in France. During an era 
when the newly independent state of Togo was massively recruiting into the administration, 
this choice appeared like an anomaly. Investing in corporate law had indeed enabled the 
conversion of the resources of this royal family, evinced from local power since the 1930s54 by 
the French colonial administration, toward the political and economic networks tying the 
country to its former métropole. One generation later, this proximity has contributed to propel 
Pascal Agboyibor within the very close-knit corporate Bar in Paris. He started his career in 
Paris first in 1993 at Jeantet et Associés, one of the French pioneers of corporate law, before 
joining the Paris branch of the U.K. firm Watson, Farley and Williams in 2000. His team then 
integrated with Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP in 2002. Agboyibor became a partner at 
Orrick in 2003. After studying law in Lille, Pascal Agboyibor built up his portfolio of African 
relations during a secondment at the African Development Bank in Abidjan in 1996, and on 
introductions from his father—notably to take on the latter’s arbitration disputes between the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and “vulture funds.”55  
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52 Interview with Pascal Agboyibor, Title, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, in Add Location of Interview here 
(May 5, 2015). Subsequent quotes in this portrait are derived from this interview.   
53 The firm was founded by the French lawyer Raymond Viale in 1937.  
54 Through a continuous re-invention of tradition, the family was recently reinstated as chief of canton by 
presidential decree under its “royal” name, Tobgui Messan Agboyibo V, in May of 2014.  
55 See Pascal Agboyibor, le ‘bélier noir’ à forte tête, JEUNE AFRIQUE (Mar. 7, 2014), 
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Agboyibor’s trajectory unveils a “layered” habitus pointing to the multiple historical 
strata of legal globalization on the African continent as much as their connections with local 
struggles and political hierarchies. But it also points to the wider transformation of corporate 
legal markets since the 1990s and the prominent yet ambiguous position of Paris in these 
developments. When he started, Agboyibor strategically invested heavily in securitization, 
positioning himself in the financialization of commodities markets, before reinvesting fully his 
African portfolio in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, which prompted the search of 
multinational corporate law firms for new markets in emerging economies, including Africa. 
While only 10 percent of his practice involved dealings on the continent in 2008, it now 
accounts for 99 percent of his time. Though, when he entered Jeantet in the early 1990s, there 
were but a handful of Africans in corporate law firms in Paris—and elsewhere. His first 
“African” case involved the Chad-Cameroun pipeline. “It was the old argument at the time. 
They needed an African to sit at the table. There is a deep symbolic violence behind all this. 
This is probably what made me leave Jeantet. There is a huge difference between French and 
Anglo-Saxon firms on this.”56 But the stormy setting up of a branch of Orrick, orchestrated by 
Agboyibor, in Abidjan in the fall 2014—it triggered an outcry by the Bar in Abidjan57—also 
emphasizes the difficult, thorny dynamic of this new wave of legal globalization on the 
continent. “I am an accident,” explained Agboyibor, “If it is only me, in Paris, it is not sufficient. 
You need African-focused lawyers who are involved, and not just legal mercenaries . . . . 
Training African lawyers by internationalizing them, that can amount to a form of 
parachuting.”58 
These two portraits offer a first explanation to account for the offshore yet connected 
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56 Interview with Pascal Agboyibor, supra note 52. 
57 See Nathalie Pierrepont, Orrick’s New Abidjan Office Sparks Harsh Words from Local Bar, AM. LAWYER 
(Nov. 3, 2014).  
58 Interview with Pascal Agboyibor, supra note 52. 
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characteristic of the “Africa” Bar in Paris, as they underline the embeddedness of the capital in 
imperial legacies. The politics of the Cold War both reinforced the symbiotic and reciprocal 
relation between the field of state power in France, and that of its former African colonies, 
economically, legally, politically, and relationally. They also confirmed the strategic position 
of Paris as an offshore site to deal with distribution conflicts over extractive resources. Thus, 
the International Chamber of Commerce had been set up in the early 1920s in Paris as an 
“offshore” site for the arbitration of disputes between corporations and states aimed specifically 
at shielding these conflicts away from political and diplomatic interests.59 Until the expansion 
of the arbitration market from the 1980s60 and throughout the bulk of the Cold War, the conflicts 
spurred by the nationalization of oil and other strategic resources of the 1960s and 1970s in the 
newly independent states were managed through diplomacy, the threat of gun-boats, and 
personal political relationships between political elites in France and its former colonies, while 
extractive deals where negotiated in the quiet corridors of the Françafrique. The politics of the 
“cultural Cold War”—including the anti-U.S. stance of Presidents Charles de Gaulle and 
François Mitterrand—were also a key driver in the structuration of the “Africa” Bar across 
politics, corporate interests, and human rights. Political struggles, notably around the Algerian 
war of independence, played an instrumental role in defining the political and ideological 
distribution of positions within this microcosm, as illustrated in the trajectory of Bourdon. 
Emblematically, the Paris Office of the Secretariat International of Amnesty International was 
set up in 1978 precisely due to the enduring links between Francophone African political elites 
and the former métropole and the position of the French capital as a harbor for political 
                                                      
59 See Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Constructing a Transatlantic Marketplace of Disputes on the Symbolic 
Foundations of International Justice, in CONTRACTUAL KNOWLEDGE: ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF LEGAL 
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opponents. Amnesty was therefore de facto involved in dynamics of “reciprocal assimilations 
of elites”61 whereby West African political elites would be, in turn, defended as opponents or 
denounced for their human rights violations by the organization.62 
These connections are particularly evidenced in the socialization of legal elites in former 
French colonies on the continent. It is but a truism that from a juridical point of view, 
decolonization was a very slow process. While French magistrates continued to be seconded to 
former colonies throughout the 1970s—due to the relative lack of trained lawyers locally—
these webs of relations are still instrumental: be it for the training of new legal elites, which for 
Francophone Africa still takes place in great part in France, and the endorsement of new law 
professors in Francophone Africa through the “agrégation” still to date chaired by French 
professors; or the mentor-pupil relations that shape the marketplace for international investment 
arbitration.63 
These developments have deeply shaped the barriers of entry into the “Africa” Bar in 
Paris: new entrants come either from a corporate platform (such as by using the platform of a 
corporation like Total) , or a political or militant background. The best positioned, however, are 
endowed with all three types of resources simultaneously. Bourdon, for example, is all the better 
positioned to hail as a vocal proponent of the criminalization of corporate crimes, that he is well 
connected to corporate milieux, political elites in France and militant organizations. The same 
applies on the militant end of the spectrum. The Comité Catholique contre la Faim (CCFD), 
one of the drivers of the complaints for the “ill-gotten wealth” (“biens mal acquis”) of African 
                                                      
61 See generally JEAN-FRANCOIS BAYART, THE STATE IN AFRICA: THE POLITICS OF THE BELLY (2d ed. 2009) 
(rejecting the assumption of African “otherness” based on stereotyped images and inviting the reader to see that 
African politics is like politics anywhere else in the world). 
62 See generally Sara Dezalay, Gérer un Conflit Armé Comme une Cause Judiciaire: l'Exemple d'Amnesty 
International en Côte d'Ivoire, 36 CRITIQUE INTERNATIONALE 55 (2007) (Fr.) (exploring how the NGO adapted 
to the post-Cold War context characterized by the transformation of the type of armed conflicts—for the most 
part internal—it had to work on, and the increasingly competitive international human rights field).  
63 See generally Sara Dezalay & Yves Dezalay, Professionals of International Justice: From the Shadow of State 
Diplomacy to the Pull of the Market of Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A PROFESSION 287 (Jean 
d’Aspremont et al. eds., 2017). 
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heads of state in France—lodged by Bourdon—was also built out of French missionary colonial 
networks on the African continent.64 Tracing the social background of Agboyibor, on the other 
hand, is instrumental to understand that the prominent position he occupies within the “Africa” 
Bar is built out of a strong family and social background, a portfolio of corporate, political 
networks in Africa, and corporate legal know-how acquired through positions in U.S. corporate 
law firms. 
In turn, to explain the prominence taken by U.S. and U.K. corporate law firms within 
this microcosm, it is also necessary to take into account the history and transformation of the 
corporate Bar in Paris. The demise of the “Republic of Lawyers” following the Second World 
War resultedtranslated in a gradual replacement of lawyers as the main state elites, with an 
administrative-political elite. The relatively recent “return” of the profession to politics—
illustrated by the move of former politicians to legal practice—has opened up a “contiguous” 
space of circulation between the legal field and the political field. 65 This was favored by 
changes in the regulation of the French legal profession, notably the widening up from 1991 of 
the rules regulating the access to the profession, and foremost its aggiornamento from the 1990s 
under the influence of U.S. and U.K. corporate law firms.66 The impact of this globalization of 
corporate law—notably the transformation of the French legal field as a whole under the New 
Public Management impetus to adapt to the model of the Wall street law firm—was all the more 
powerful given the long-standing shunning of business and corporate matters within a legal 
profession more willing to endorse political causes.67 Indeed, in the 1950s there were only a 
handful of corporate law firms. The growth of a corporate legal market in France, foremost in 
                                                      
64 See S. Dezalay, Revamping Law by Circumventing the State: Non-governmental Organizations in the 
International Management of Social Violence on the African Continent, (unpublished PhD thesis PhD of Laws, 
European University Institute, on file with Cadmus, EUI Research Repository). 
65 See generally Vauchez, supra note 19. 
66 See generally Yves Dezalay, Marchands de Droit. La Restructuration de l’Ordre Juridique International par 
les Multinationales du Droit, 7 POLITIX 156 (1994) (Fr.) (tracing the legal “big bang” fostered by the 
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Paris, followed the drive of these pioneers, in the context of the emergence of the European 
economic market. Fernand-Charles Jeantet, in particular, had converted to the Wall Street law 
firm model—rather than the traditional family law firm dominant then in France—based on his 
experiences in the United States and the United Kingdom.68  
Certainly, part of the success of U.S. and U.K. corporate law firms in dominating the 
“Africa” Bar in Paris also stems out of the huge capacity of firms—as opposed to single legal 
practice—in dodging the volatility of markets for extractives (and with them, legal markets), 
including by waging multi-front legal strategies: from the negotiation of contracts to arbitration 
or litigation. As underscored by a respondent: “The difference between Agboyibor and others 
is the structure of the firm; it is better than having lone lawyers doing all the work.”69 Yet, it is 
also no accident that predominantly French lawyers operate within this marketplace. This 
enables these firms to build on a symbolic displacement, away from the stigma of the 
Françafrique, while still also benefiting from the know-who of these lawyers. The U.S. 
corporate law firm White & Case, for example, secured a foothold in Francophone Africa in 
the 1990s when it represented Algeria in the restructuring of its external debt. The choice of a 
U.S. firm was then a decidedly anti-French and anti-colonial stance on the side of the Algerian 
government.  
The second series of portraits—of four other lawyers within the “Africa” Bar in Paris— 
underscores the endurance of the web of the political, economic, and social relations built out 
of imperial legacies within this corporate legal market.   
III. FROM THE TENORS OF THE “AFRICA CLUB” TO THE NEW GUARD: REVAMPING THE TERMS 
OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AFRICA AND THE WORLD? 
 
1. Julien, McDermott, Will and Emery LLP 
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Julien receives me in his spacious office—the first time during this fieldwork: a room 
with softened light, strewn with African masks, fabrics, a picture on the wall showing the 
basketball team of Zaïre in the 1970s and featuring a young Julien. A friend of Antoine, and 
the mentor of Pierre (see portrait below), Julien is hailed as the “historical Godfather” of what 
respondents and the media described as an “Africa Club.” This amiable French, white lawyer, 
now well into his eighties, explained that he entered the field “by accident.”70 “My trajectory is 
unusual. I obtained a scholarship from the US Officers’ Wives Club after the second world war 
to go study in the U.S.” After obtaining a Juris Doctor degree, he entered the U.S. corporate 
law firm Duncan Allen & Mitchell, before being dispatched by the firm in 1974 to Kinshasa, 
the capital of then Zaïre. The firm wanted to set up a local office:  
The associate there was an American “with big boots,” the son of an infrastructure 
entrepreneur. He did not have the sensitivity to work for Africans. At first, I was not 
interested, but I decided to stay. At the time [in New York] there was hardly any 
international work, I never saw clients. There I could combine the two.71 
 
 The context was also that of the “white elephants” infrastructure projects in Zaïre.72 “Mobil, 
Texaco, First National Citibank: business was booming.”73  
Julien went back to Paris at the end of the 1970s as an associate of the U.S. corporate 
firm Coudert Brothers. “A month later, I was contacted by Air Zaïre, to be the advisor of the 
[Congolese] presidency.”74  As counsel to the presidency, he undertook the reform of the 
pharmaceutical sector, and was also in charge of military contracts and the negotiation of bank 
loans. “I came back to Paris. I was then inevitably branded with an ‘African’ label. Due to my 
Zaïran background, I have always done mining law. But I became a generalist ‘African.’”75 He 
developed Coudert’s Africa practice—with, and that was exceptional at the time, a team of 
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African lawyers. “At the time, Coudert was the only firm to do international law. If you came 
to Paris to work at the Paris office of a U.S./U.K. corporate law firm, it was, as a Frenchman, 
automatically to do international law.”76 After the disbanding of Coudert in 2006, he moved to 
the Paris branch of the U.S. firm Dewey and Leboeuf and then that of the Canadian firm Fasken 
Martineau. Moving along the quick transformation of the market for corporate law (due to 
mergers etc.), he also brought with him his teams, and is now striving to re-constitute the 
“Africa” teams he had developed at Coudert. “We do not do off-shore law. But we do not need 
to work with local lawyers. Anyway, if clients contact us, we can do the work, we do not need 
to go through local lawyers.”77  
2. Pierre, Jeantet et Associés 
Pierre was admitted to the Bar in Paris in 1991, before entering Jeantet & Associés in 
1992. As an associate and chair of the eEnergy, mines and infrastructures department—focused 
predominantly on Africa—at this French corporate law firm, “Pierre” is also an academic. With 
a research master of laws in international law and international trade law in 1981, a master in 
international and comparative energy law in 1982 from the University Paris I-Sorbonne, a 
visiting scholarship at Berkeley in 1983-1985, and a PhD of law from the University Paris XIII 
on contracts related to the exploitation of natural resources, he now is also a law professor at 
the University Paris II, where he heads the diploma on international economic law in Africa. 
This academic profile is a specificity of the alma mater of French corporate law firms, Jeantet 
et Associés. Founded in 1922 by Pierre Lepaulle, the first Frenchman to obtain the Scientiae 
Juridicae Doctoris at Harvard, joined by Fernand-Charles Jeantet after the Second World War, 
himself a law professor at Harvard and a specialist of competition law.78 In the framework of 
the Marshall plan, the firm played an instrumental role to foster the implantation of U.S. 
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corporate law firms in Europe—through Paris—and to develop European community law.  
Before entering Jeantet, Pierre had worked for five years at Coudert as well as at Total, 
the French multinational oil corporation: “The preparation of files [contracts, project finance], 
it has a snowball effect. Reputation is difficult to establish, but once it’s there, it’s there.”79 
Once at Jeantet,  
I set up the energy structure in 1993. It was the only one, focused on energy and natural 
resources, to provide for the whole gamut of services: contract negotiation all the way 
through to arbitration. We have a single team that can deal with both. So if the market 
shifts, one of the poles can compensate for the other. 
 
When I started, I was derided. Everybody was criticizing the endeavour . . . . We were 
the only law firm with a local office in Africa, from the colonial era, then in Algiers, 
because Jeantet was from there. I innovated, I brought in an African to the office [it was 
Pascal Agboyibor].80  
 
Pierre is now orchestrating the setting upsetup of a local branch of the firm in 
Casablanca, in Morocco—with the idea of “developing the practice of the firm” in Morocco.  
3. Dominique, Jones Day 
Hailed as one of the prominent corporate lawyers operating in dealings in Africa in the 
2015 rating of Jeune Afrique, 81 Dominique, of counsel at the Paris office of the U.S. corporate 
law firm Jones Day since 2010, predominantly advises corporations. Recently, he negotiated a 
concession for the airports of Antanarivo and Nosy Be in Madagascar, on behalf of a consortium 
led by Bouygues and Aéroports de Paris. He also advises states, such as Guinea for the 
negotiation of the Simandou project for the extraction of iron ore by the Australian mining 
corporation Rio Tinto. On obtaining a master in public and administrative law in Paris, he did 
a stint at the European investment bank, before working at Herbert Smith Freehills—under the 
mentorship of Antoine —between 2001–2010.  
I did not turn to Herbert Smith Freehills by accident. At the time, it was the only law 
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firm which provided services to both states and corporations in Africa. . . . I have a 
background in public law. Administrative law is a supporting science in France. I did 
not want to be a “support” lawyer. I wanted to do transactions . . . . Most of my 
experience is for the private sector; but I am starting to work also for the public sector, 
but it is less lucrative . . . . It is not an altruistic stance. Upstream [before projects are 
negotiated], you have an increased involvement of development actors. Millions of 
pages have been written on public-private partnerships, but there is a tendency to 
ritualize these tools. It’s the problem of transplants. 82  
 
However, “relations with local lawyers [in Africa] are extremely complicated. In Bangui, 
we simply had to ‘create’ our local respondent, because there were simply no corporate 
lawyers . . . . In some countries, our local respondents do not want to take orders. There is a 
locking-up of the local legal market.”83 
4. Bruno, Eversheds LLP 
Bruno, a partner at the U.K. corporate law firm Eversheds LLP where he heads the 
“Africa Group” of the firm’s branch in Paris, obtained masters in common law and corporate 
law, before working for Total in 1995, and Landwell PwC (PwC’s legal office in Paris) between 
1995–2000, where he worked for a while under the aegis of Antoine. “I left in 2000 because I 
was looking for a smaller structure. I developed Eversheds’ practice in Africa between 2000–
2007. I managed to convince colleagues of the relevance of working on Africa.”84  After 
launching the “Africa Group” of the firm in 2007, he contributed to developing its “Africa Law 
Institute,” a network designed to enable members of its thirty-eight partner organizations in 
Africa (in both Francophone and Anglophone Africa) to access legal training. With now eight 
local offices on the continent—in Casablanca, Johannesburg, Mauritius, Morocco, Tangier, and 
Tunis85—the firm has also been at the fore-front of the development of the Organisation pour 
l’harmonisation en Afrique du droit des affaires (OHADA) system in West Africa, including 
                                                      
82 Interview with Dominique, LawyerTitle, Jones Day, in Paris, Fr. (Apr. 9, 2015). My translation from French. 
All quotes in this portrait are derived from this interview. 
83 Id. 
84 Interview with Bruno, Title, Eversheds, in Paris, Fr. (Apr. 8, 2015). My translation from French. Subsequent 
quotes in this portrait are derived from this interview. 
85 See Hannah Gannage-Stewart, Eversheds and Norton Rose Fulbright Ramp up in Africa with Local Alliances , 
LAWYER (Feb. 1, 2015), https://www.thelawyer.com/issues/online-february-2015/eversheds-and-norton-rose-
fulbright-ramp-up-in-africa-with-local-alliances/. 
Commented [AC14]: The title of the interviewee should 
be added to the citation. We removed the word “lawyer” 
but we can retain this if you wish! We were unsure if 
you’d rather put Associate or Partner/Senior Partner, etc.  
Commented [AC15]: The Title of the interviewee should 
be added to the citation. 
  26 
through an OHADA law diploma delivered to Francophone (French and African) students by 
the Universities Panthéon-Assas and Paris 13 since 2014. Bruno stated,  
I think a lot of firms advertise an opening towards Africa, but they are very far from 
having achieved it. We took risks. Some individuals work predominantly on oil, 
minerals. I have had a much wider portfolio of activities, from the start. As a firm, we 
provide the full range of services.86 
 
These four portraits underline how embedded the “Africa” Bar is in the fabric of French-
African relations shaped the clientele—states and corporations—of law firms operating in 
Africa. “In the 1970s Elf had its own legal services. They would never even have had the idea 
of hiring corporate lawyers. These inside advisors were from the Corps des Mines”87 explained 
a long-term French associate within the Paris office of Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton.88 
Further, “banks orient dealings in Africa, mainly U.S. and U.K. banks. The French have always 
done business in Africa. Though they rarely invest. For Anglo-Saxon law firms [having an 
Africa department] is certainly a marketing strategy” 89  toward a corporate clientele of 
newcomers into the continent. An American partner at the Paris office of Clifford Chance 
Europe LLP explained:  
If you look at law firms’ expansion, it is through project finance, and generally 
development and financing. At the moment, almost 100% of my time is on Africa . . . . 
We turned to Africa in the context of the crisis, in the late 2000s. I am not sure they will 
stay after the market picks up, because it is certainly a lot easier to do business in New 
York . . . . The firm recognizes that its business in Africa is not the most lucrative. But 
we want to be a blue-chip firm that corporations look to.90  
 
A partner at Jones Day explained how this “blue chip” strategy worked, in terms of 
specialization within this small market: “When you look at the corporate side, you find a lot 
more firms. It is the same for everything else: you do one transaction and then you become a 
specialist [in mining, oil, infrastructure]. But when you look at the government side it’s 
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completely different.”91 
Yet, these portraits also underscore a clear generational break between the tenors of the 
“Africa club,” and a younger generation—both more technically savvy and more concerned 
with the stakes involved in developing the operations of their firms on the continent—including 
the need to co-opt and train local (i.e., African) interlocutors. Indeed, it is perhaps on the side 
of services to states that the transformation of the “Africa” Bar in Paris is the deepest. Julien, 
the “Godfather” of the “Africa” Bar clearly emphasized this:  
We still work a lot for states, but it is mostly private practice. The practice of counselling 
for states has evolved. It is more transparent, more open. Now it works a lot on the basis 
of tenders. Before it was through encounters. Presidents and political advisors would 
meet their counsels by chance encounters, in restaurants. Now—except for counsels to 
Presidents, where it is different, it is all on the basis of tenders.92  
 
Initiatives such as CONNEX, or the African Legal Facility mentioned above, aim 
precisely at taming the still very charismatic nature of the market for services to African states.  
However, the prominence taken by international financial institutions in this restructuring is 
also strengthening the role of development actors and policies in the transformation of the 
connection between Africa and global markets. As explained by a respondent: “African 
governments make a mistake when they do not have a counsel of a sufficient calibre”93 during 
the phase of negotiations:  
They look for the best bidder. It is only when there is a crisis, when the dispute goes to 
arbitration that they call in the big shots. The law then is dealt with at the highest 
levels . . . . CONNEX: it is an intelligent initiative. But the sticking point was that the 
Germans [just as other development partners] wanted services to states to be pro bono. 
Why ask law firms to do pro bono work? It’s beautiful, but it’s neo-colonial. If you want 
to re-structure the market, you need to do it right.94  
 
This points to one of the stakes of this impetus to restructure the “Africa” Bar in Paris: 
the competition for access to the African continent, in a context of acute global competition for 
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extractive boons, and corporate legal markets. Opening the market of services to African 
governments—including through pro bono endeavours—has been a key strategy of some U.S. 
and U.K. corporate law firms, especially in areas of the continent where they could not rely 
directly on the social networks of imperial legacies. As explained by a partner at Jones Day and 
one of the promoters of the CONNEX initiative:  
You cannot make a career on Africa. ‘Africa’ work is either for corporations or 
governments. For corporations it is primarily energy, project finance. You can do that 
full time. But you cannot do government work full time. It does not pay. There is no 
way you can make billable hours working for a government. It is a different way of 
doing business. If I have a corporate client, they will call me and ask me for the costs, 
then they will call back, and they will say, “let’s move.” With the governments, they 
never pay. There is always an international organization that pays. They always have a 
tender process that takes months, a technical proposal, a financial proposal that will take 
forty hours. And this, you cannot bill. My credentials are pretty well known. For 
instance, when GIZ [the German development agency] call, they know me, but still it 
takes months.95  
 
 The difference indeed, lies in the know-who: “Then you have those people who have 
the know-how, like Pascal Agboyibor, who can also speak to heads of state. That is something 
else. It is also a question of positioning.”96 Pro bono initiatives thus would tend to slightly 
displace the inter-personal relations between Paris-based lawyers and their political 
counterparts in African settings, toward the framework of development assistance. But this still 
reinforces the stronghold of agents with capacities of access built out of a portfolio of political, 
economic, social, and legal resources, such as Agboyibor. Yet, the position of the latter, and his 
difficulties in setting up a local branch of Orrick in Abidjan, also highlight the thorny path of 
this new phase of globalization into the African continent. As the Godfather of the “Africa” Bar 
explained: “International law firms are scared to be outpaced by local lawyers.”97 The offshore, 
yet connected, structure of the “Africa” Bar in Paris could thus be an enduring feature, 
depending on the pace of development and varied structure of national legal fields on the 
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African continent.    
CONCLUSION: EXTRACTIVE ECONOMIES IN AFRICA, A PETRI DISH OF LAYERED AND 
CONNECTED HISTORIES OF LEGAL GLOBALIZATION 
 
In media and specialist accounts, talks of the end of the commodities’ “super cycle”—
and with it, the fear of African states plunging into the debt crisis of the 1980s—have re-ignited 
the “resource curse” or “Dutch disease” debate, which connects the vulnerability of resource-
rich African economies to the weakness of domestic governance mechanisms 98  and the 
desirability of governing trade and financial flows globally. 99 In policy, media, and many 
scholarly accounts, this weakness of Africa economies has been linked to the failure of the legal 
systems inherited from colonization.100 The need to reform—if not reinvent—political, legal, 
and economic institutions continues to be heralded as a way to check the tendency toward 
personal, tyrannical, and anti-entrepreneurial governance.101   
Yet, the thriving of private foreign investments in the very countries hailed as “failures,” 
like Angola or the Democratic Republic of Congo102 opens a much more complex image than 
the mere economic dependency of the continent—notably with the expansion of a “Beijing 
consensus” freed from political conditionality, and outside the scope of U.S. imperial 
politics.103 This renewed prominence of the African continent as a boon for extractive resources 
also comes in a context that contrasts markedly with the “new extraction” in Latin American 
contexts a decade earlier.104 The mining boom of the last two decades was most pronounced in 
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Latin America, with a growth of the global share of Latin America in mining investment from 
10 to 25 percent between 2003 and 2012, but to a large extent the rush is yet to come in Africa 
where mineral reserves remain for the most part untapped. In Latin American contexts, the new 
extraction has been accompanied by strong political and social movements fostering a radical 
agenda of post-extractivism and asserting indigenous rights of local communities over 
extractive resources, notably through the increased exercise of the right to free, prior, and 
informed consent institutionalized in various international legal instruments since the 1980s. 
By contrast, the rush for extractive minerals in African contexts, particularly in conflict-rife 
Democratic Republic of Congo over the 1990s and elsewhere on the continent, came at the tail 
end of structural adjustment programs, spearheaded by International Financial Institutions, 
which engineered the privatization of extractive economies to foster the regulatory strength of 
private actors and markets against political elites and weak governance. Not only did these 
policies do little to curb the Far-West like rush into Africa, they also unleashed acute levels of 
violence.  
[I]t is precisely this dialectic that has pushed Africa . . .  to the vanguard of the epoch, 
making [these old margins] at once contemporary frontiers and new centres of 
capitalism—which, to reiterate, in its latest, most energetically voracious phase, thrives 
in environments in which the protections of liberal democracy, of the rule of law, of the 
labor contract, and of the ethics of civil society are, at best, uneven.105  
 
Indeed, as this article has attempted to highlight, the renewed—advocated or 
contested—prominence of the African continent in the global competition for extractive 
resources opens an opportunity, and needed inquiry, to assess the relationship between capital 
investment, politics, and law in these transformations, and specifically the (re)definition of 
transnational landscapes of law in these shifts.  
The position of the “Africa” Bar in Paris underscored the relevance of looking at the 
past to understand these changes, and how “Africa” is being built into a new legal market. Paris, 
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thus, is a nexus of “connected histories”106: U.S.-led corporate legal globalization, colonial, and 
postcolonial relations, and currently the global competition between the United States, Europe 
and powerful new economic and political centers, like China, over raw commodities. These 
connected and layered developments help understand historical change, including legal 
developments, in sequence, as a “revival” where “the colonial imprint of law provides the core 
that defines the revival.”107 Indeed the rich and recent scholarship on empires108 has traced 
paths to define a future research agenda to connect state and legal developments, with economic 
models of extraction on the African continent and transformations in the structure of the global 
economy.  
Arguably, the era of European colonial empires in Africa was exceptional, both in terms 
scale and time, but there was a remarkable gap between the ambition of  modern colonialism in 
terms of social, technological innovations and the limited spaces of deployment of colonial 
rule.109 Indeed, compared to other regions, such as Asia, one perhaps singular specificity of the 
colonial enterprise in the African continent was its extreme diversity between colonies of 
settlement and, extraction, etc.among others. This uneven and patchy colonial enterprise left 
fragmented societies and great diversities of economic conditions in their wake. Legal 
pluralism , as the legal vehicle to accommodate diversity and meager colonial resources, 
became a constant and general fix of colonial rule.110 For their part, the legal institutions and 
professions that emerged out of the colonial era were vastly varied across regions, even 
sometimes in the same countries, according to the specificities of colonial legal, economic, and 
political strategies at the local level.111 Thus, the boon of extractive economies from the slave 
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trade, through to the modern colonial era, make these a paradigmatic site, to reiterate, to trace 
the uneven and unequal connections between Africa and the world.112 This is the case not only 
because of the symbiotic relationship in the development of modern capitalist economies in the 
métropoles that built out of their imperial synergies 113  and the colonial roots of the 
contemporary legal and economic international system, but also because of the way the impetus 
for extraction shaped the colonial and post-colonial field of state power in African settings.  
Tracing this colonial imprint is instrumental to map out the postcolonial trajectories of 
African states, economically, politically, and legally. Cooper’s image of the “gatekeeper 
state”114 is a useful entry-point to look at this evolution both at the domestic level—in the legal, 
political, and social ramifications of extractive economies nationally—and in the relation 
between resource-rich states with global markets, former métropoles and the capitals of finance, 
development institutions, and foreign corporations. For example, the logic of “ring-fencing” 
the oil industry in Angola, away from the wider economy of the state,115 contrasts with the 
economic path taken in South Africa from the turn of the twentieth
 
century, which tightly 
articulated the exploitative dimension of the mining industry with a wider social development 
project.116  These two contrasted economic models—replicated in varied modes across the 
continent—impact the “resource curse” of the dependency on primary commodities for the 
wider national economy. They have also contributed to shaping the routes, shadow and official, 
of capital flows, as much as the dynamic of capitalist expansion within the continent.   
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On the other hand, the structure of markets for extractives and these markets’ evolution 
from the pre- and colonial eras (from the slave trade onward) has continuously played into 
contests at the local, national, and international levels, which were also heavily mediated by 
lawyers, often from the métropoles, but also in some settings like Ghana and Nigeria, by local 
lawyers: between merchants, colonial administrations, and local elites. 117  These layered 
connections and contests have shaped the subsequent waves of restructuring of extractive 
economies nationally—from the post-independence waves of nationalization, to the “neo-
liberal” privatizations of the 1980s through to the current reinstatement of the state as a 
development partner in “public-private partnerships.” They are also at the core of contests over 
the definition of “development,” as a responsibility of private extractive corporations, 
development institutions, and NGOs, or that of the state. Further, the highly fragmented 
structure of the global market for minerals, which gives the upper hand to private corporations 
(mostly Northern) in the production, pricing, and investment decisions, while allowing for the 
multiplicity of intermediaries, from local chiefs through to red-neck extractive companies less 
vulnerable to reputational costs, plays into the relative breadth and scope of global regulatory 
frameworks, themselves shaped by intense economic and political struggles between the United 
States and Asia.  
Law is at the core of these developments. Initiatives aimeding at transforming the 
asymmetrical relationship between African states and private Northern corporations—like 
CONNEX or the African Legal Facility—stem from the need to stabilize foreign investments, 
away from the economic, political, and reputational costs of the renegotiation of extractive 
contracts, and their contests in arbitrational and jurisdictional settings, including by third parties 
like local communities. The vindicated challenge thus, of “levelling the playing field,” is also 
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to foster the emergence of trade-oriented national state elites as much as to control, rationalize, 
and open up the small markets of insiders—such as the multi-positioned members of the “Africa 
Club” in Paris away from the stigmata of affairisme. What made the “Africa” Bar in Paris 
offshore, yet deeply connected, was the tension between the need to rely on local structures of 
power to do business on the continent, and the strategy of evading local legal institutions that 
were deemed inefficient and corrupted. But at stake is also the intense competition at play in 
this new wave of globalization into the continent, with international corporate law firms vying 
to secure their turf in a volatile and fragile market against local competitors. The stake now, in 
the next step of this research agenda, is precisely to zoom in onto these local legal markets to 
trace their transformation over time in relation to national fields of state power, regional 
dynamics, and their connections with former métropoles and new poles of global power.  
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